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Abstract—Port knocking is a technique by which only a single
packet or special sequence will permit the firewall to open a port
on a machine where all ports are blocked by default. It is a passive
authorization technique which offers firewall-level authentication
to ensure authorized access to potentially vulnerable network
services. In this paper, we present performance evaluation and
analytical comparison of three widely used port knocking (PK)
algorithms, Aldaba, FWKNOP and SIG-2. Comparative analysis
is based upon ten selected parameters; Platforms (Supported
OS), Implementation (PK, SPA or both), Protocols (UDP, TCP,
ICMP), Out of Order packet delivery, NAT (Network Address
Translation), Encryption Algorithms, Root privileges (For instal-
lation and operation), Weak Passwords, Replay Attacks and IPv6
compatibility. Based upon these parameters, relative performance
score has been given to each algorithm. Finally, we deduce that
FWKNOP due to compatibility with windows client is the most
efficient among chosen PK implementations.
Index Terms—Port Knocking; Firewall knock operator; User
Datagram Protocol; Authenticating User; Internet Protocol ;Sin-
gle Packet Authorization;Network Address Translator; Man In
the Middle; Secure Shell; Transmission Control Protocol
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET became part of our life fourty-one years ago.From the beginning we know that Internet is acting as a
hostile place. So it is important to keep a check on unautho-
rized intrusion and other harmful invaders. The importance
of securing the hostile world of internet has increased now,
because there have not been such deadly risks before. Reason
of this increased security risk is the introduction of Internet.
The only secured system is the one that has no connection with
the outside world. But internet is the other name of connection,
so it is impossible to have no connection with the world and
have Internet at the same time. Only thing that can be done is
to limit the number of people and set of instructions accessible
to the computer.
Many security schemes have been developed to fight against
the attacks and risks but the attackers have improved within
same manners. One way to limit access to selected users is
by using an authentication method, but this is not a perfect
solution. User first to prove its identity and then access is
granted to that user upon verification of authenticity. Many
large and complicated systems have suffered from flaws in
their authentication mechanisms, which make secure systems
vulnerable to the attackers. One usual method of limiting the
hosts is to use firewall.
Fig. 1. All well-known ports of secure server are closed by PK firewall so
when an attacker try to directly get connected to port 22, the firewall will
simply drop its packet and will not allow attacker to access any secure port
directly
Firewall selectively accepts and rejects network packets by
considering their source address and other important charac-
teristics. Some dangerous attackers are capable enough to hide
the source of packets sent by them. Users having unpredictable
IP can also easily pass through firewall. So firewall is also not
a complete solution as well.
Fig. 2. An authentic client who knows the predefined sequence of knocks
which will act as a key will send tcp sync packets to those pre-defines
sequence of ports
Port knocking is a kind of security mechanism installed
over firewall of secure computer systems. Basically what port
knocking does is that it provides with another security layer
over the security we already have. PK close all ports of the
system on which it is implemented, It also works on the
principle of least privileged as it blocks all the unauthorized
users at first and we can say that there is a visible enhancement
in the security to that of a system with no port knocking
mechanism, PK scenario is explained through figures from
1-a to 1-d.
The steps involved in PK authentication can be clearly
understood through the flowchart in figure 2. The flow chart
provides a detailed step wise complete procedure of a gen-
eral PK authentication mechanism. Since the advent of PK
authentication scheme a lot of PK algorithms have been
presented with different characteristics. So what we have
done is carried out a performance evaluation and analytical
2comparison of three widely used PK algorithms against ten
different parameters.
Fig. 3. PK demon installed on secure server firewall will silently watch those
packets and if theses port knocks found to be in correct pre-defined order the
client will be considered as authentic client, and PK demon will open clients
requested port.
Fig. 4. Authentic client after successful authentication will get connected
to the secure server through one of the well-known port opened by the PK
demon
In section II related work and motivation is described,
section III contains description of all ten parameters on basis
of which performance evaluation will be done, after that limits
of scores will be defined and a performance evaluation will be
carried out assigning scores to a particular algorithm against
ten parameters according to its performance and compatibility
with that parameter. Then separate graphs will be presented
for all three algorithms which represents their scores against
ten parameters, and then combining all these three graphs
an overall comparison graphs is plotted to comparatively
demonstrate their scores and distinguish the best one out
of these three, in the same section we have also presented
some unique features of all three PK algorithms. Then finally
in section IV we concluded this analytical comparison and
defined the best algorithm against ten parameters.
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
Hussein Al-Bahadili [1]; develops and evaluate parameters
of newly built PK implementation referred with the name of
hybrid, which have the capability to defeat previous knocking
techniques. This new technique uses concepts of PK, mutual
authentication and steganography.
RenniedeGraaf, Improved Port Knocking with Strong Au-
thentication [2]; studies existing PK implementation, improves
existing PK techniques, builds a new PK technique which is
refers to as novel port knocking technique.
Authors in [3]; presents improvements in existing PK and
SPA techniques like using one time password method using
cellular networks such as CDMA, GSM to enhance security,
defines protection against dictionary attacks.
Muhammad Tariq et al. Associating the Authentication and
Connection Establishment Phases in Passive Authorization
Techniques, Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineer-
ing 2008 , London, U.K [4]; define weaknesses like lack of
link between establishment of a TCP connection, highlight
authentication process, presents another novel PK technique,
simulation carried out to evaluate algorithms on the basis of
overhead calculations.
KonstantinosXynos and Andrew Blyth [5]; propose an idea
of implementing port knocking technique over a gateway
authentication layer or gateway authentication program or net-
work service program instead of firewall, eliminate problems
with firewalls and reduce brute force attacks.
Ben Maddock [6]; defines portknocking and its benefits in
detail, elaborates features of existing portknocking techniques,
finally future offer exploration and PK conclusion.
Dawn Isabel, Port Knocking: Beyond the Basics [7]; pro-
vides three solutions for two basic problems with static PK i.e.
detection and replay, propose solutions of dynamic knocks,
covert knocks, and one time knocks; implementing these
solutions over four PK techniques.
Sebastien Jeanquier [7] in his MS thesis, ”An Analysis of
Port Knocking and Single Packet Authorization”; analyzes PK
and SPA as network security mechanisms, performs compati-
bility as firewall authentication schemes and discusses draw-
backs and outcomes in current PK implementations, critical
evaluation of FWKNOP, outlining its outcomes and suggesting
some remedies.
Work done by Sabastien is of great regard as it provides
evaluation of a single PK over several parameters but there can
also be a research of several widely used PK implementations
against different parameters so that a new person in this field
can come to know that which implementation is the best, so
we have done this work in this research paper by analytically
evaluating several widely used PK implementations on ten
parameters. We have presented our data with the help of graphs
to provide an even better view to the reviewer.
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PK ALGORITHMS
In this paper we have evaluated the performance of three
PK algorithms under different scenarios and parameters. Then
we presented their performance comparison. For this purpose
we have selected following ten performance parameters. Pa-
rameters:
Platforms (Supported OS)
Implementation (PK, SPA or both)
Protocols (UDP, TCP, ICMP)
Out of Order packet delivery
NAT (Network Address Translation)
Encryption Algorithms
Root privileges (For installation and operation)
Weak Passwords
Replay Attacks
IPv6 compatibility
We have plotted graphs of each algorithm against these
parameters. The range of performance score is 0-100. It means
that the better is the performance of the algorithm against a
parameter the better is the score assigned to that algorithm.
Which means that a score of 100 will be awarded to that
algorithm which will fully supports the aspects of the given
parameter and has solution to all the issues related with that
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Fig. 5. Port Knocking Flowchart
metric. Similarly if algorithm is not robust enough against that
parameter then it will get a relatively less score.
Platforms means the OS which are supported, in FWKNOP
the client can supports both Windows and UNIX based ver-
sions but it can only have a UNIX based server hence it has
given score of 80, while Aldaba scores a 50 due to the presence
of only UNIX based client and server, sig-2 has maximum
score due to both Windows and UNIX based client and server.
Implementation stands for the Port Knocking scheme use
either PK or SPA or both. In this case Aldaba scores 100
due to support with both PK and SPA, on the other hand
FWKNOP and SIG-2 both scores a 50 because they only use
one implementation.
FWKNOP supports three protocols namely UDP, TCP and
ICMP so it has been awarded maximum score i.e 100, on
the other hand Aldaba supports UDP and TCP so it has been
awarded 70 points whereas SIG-2 supports only TCP so it has
been given 50 points.
The problem of Out of Order packet delivery is inherent
in contemporary networks, in FWKNOP this is not an issue
because it uses SPA which comprises of only a single packet
hence it has maximum score in this regard. In SIG-2, there is
no solution for this problem and so, no score, while Aldaba
handles it by using Sequence Numbers, so it has maximum
score.
NAT is widely used in present day networks and the problem
is that the client has to know its public IP address before
implementing PK as it can’t include it private IP address in
the authorization packet. FWKNOP automatically obtains the
public IP address, so, it earns maximum score. Aldaba resolves
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Fig. 7. Performance graph of FWKNOP
this issue by letting the client specify its public IP address, as
this puts the client in some misery so Aldaba has score of 50.
SIG-2 has no solution to this issue so no score for this.
Fig. 8. Performance graph of SIG-2
Encryption is a vital part of PK and the more encryption
algorithms a PK implementation supports the better it is.
Hence Aldaba has the maximum score because it supports
5 encryption algorithms compared with 2 in FWKNOP and
only 1 in SIG-2 who has score of 50 and 30 respectively.
In FWKNOP and SIG-2 root privileges are required for
installation only, which gives it 80 score. Aldaba on the other
hand requires it for both installation and operation hence
getting only a score of 50.
If the passphrases which are used to encrypt and decrypt
the PK packets or SPA packet are weak [7] i.e vulnerable to
dictionary and Brute Force attacks then an attacker in the Man
in the Middle Position can easily capture the authorization
packet and can obtain the passphrase, once he has got the
passphrase he can decrypt the packet and use the information
for crafting his own packet. Unfortunately none of these three
PK implementations has solution to this problem. Hence no
score is given to any of the three algorithms.
An eavesdropper inside network [7] is who has ability to
watch traffic between client and server. It means that attacker
can replay the authorization packet on its way from client to
server and replay it at a later time. In this way attacker can gain
access to the server by replacing the IP address as server has no
method to know that the received packet is from a valid client
or it is just a replay packet by an attacker. FWKNOP solves
this problem by including a timestamp inside authorization
packet which is accurate up to minutes and also it includes
some random data. The presence of timestamp and random
data ensures that the received packet is fresh packet and not an
old replayed packet so it gives maximum score to FWKNOP
due to through resolution of this issue. In Aldaba this issue
is resolved by including the IP address of the client inside
authorization packet but it is not a complete solution because
an attacker can still modify the IP address if he knows the
passphrase, so we give Aldaba a 50 score for this parameter.
SIG-2 also uses timestamp but it doesn’t have the feature of
random data so it also scores 50.
Both Aldaba and FWKNOP are fully compatible with IPv6
which gives them a maximum score whereas SIG-2 is not
compatible with IPv6 so no score for it.
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Fig. 9. Overall Comparison
A. FWKNOP Unique Features
Besides these parameters there are also some features which
are unique to these PK implementations. In this section we will
also discuss them.
FWKNOP has features like Port randomization support for
target port of SPA packets and the port over which secondary
connection is made using iptables. Later to access granted to
local sockets on the system running FWKNOP and to forward
such connections to internal services.
5FWKNOP also has comprehensive test suite which allows
series of tests which are designed to validate both the client
and server pieces either they are installed properly or not. Tests
sniff SPA packets throughout the interface of local loopback,
this builds brief firewall rules which are verifies against the
particular access based on some testing configuration, later
analyzing output of fwknop client and server for predictable
outcomes for each test. This result can be utilized for sake of
communication with the third parties investigation.
Multiple users at the same time are also supported by
FWKNOP, every user is assigned its own symmetric or asym-
metric encryption key through /etc/fwknop/access.conf file.
Outfits versioned protocol of SPA, and makes it convenient
to extend protocol offer for another SPA message and at
the same time maintains backwards compatibility with other
FWKNOP clients at the same time. Fwknop also implies ex-
ecution of shell commands on basis of effective SPA packets.
B. Aldaba Unique Features
Application which produces packets at its own should be
careful in the creation of process. Latest protocols must sup-
port some authentic checksums, special byte orders, particular
values, etc. If packets do not follow these principles, routers,
firewalls and other such network devices can have problems
resulting in discard of packets before reaching to their host.
Multiple knocking attempts should be supported for systems
that have two or more than two users so that they can make
themselves able to handle multiple listening at a time. In a
case where system is having some deficiencies in its design,
we can have problem when two clients send different knocks
at same time can interfere with knocks of each other which
will result as a DOS (denial of service) for both of clients.
Knock with originating IP address should associate any
PK implementation. This can be done quite easily, so that
is why most of the PK systems use it. Actual problem is that
an attacker can detect start of knock sequence, and then he
can fake his own packets with any kind of random data by
deceiving the client’s IP address and sending this information
to knocking server with in a valid knock causing server to
evaluate incorrect data resulting in discard of knock and denial
of service for client.
This problem is not present in Aldaba in the case where
authentication protocol is SPA due to the reason that only
single packet is involved in such process. Port Knocking is
vulnerable to such an attack. Till now Aldaba does not have
any proper solution for this problem so still there is a chance
that a client will suffer DOS attack in a case when an attacker
is able to guess knocking sequence and detect the start of a
knocking attempt made by client.
Port knocking causes additional load while listening to the
incoming packets due to process being done by knocking
server where ports scanning is carried out.
Also, whenever start of a knocking attempt is detected, then
new data structures will be generated in order to handle them.
Moreover, Aldaba also keeps complete record of all knocking
attempts that are under process or have to be processed. New
data entry is created whenever start of a knock is detected, if
an attacker comes to know about the ports that forms knocking
sequence, it will be able to create and send different source IP
addresses of multiple packets. In such a case knocking server
treat this situation as multiple clients are trying to send a knock
so a node will be created for each different IP. If attacker will
keep on sending false knocks then a time will come when
system will eventually run out of memory and the ultimate
result will be crash the server.
C. SIG-2 unique features
Sig-2 does not contain any such unique features other than
those which we have already mentioned above.
IV. CONCLUSION
After the performance evaluation it is concluded that SIG-
2 Port Knocking is a backward and weak implementation as
we can clearly see through graphs. FWKNOP and Aldaba Port
Knocking are good implementation with nearly same features.
Ability of FWKNOP to use windows client as well gives it a
slight edge over Aldaba port Knocking.
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